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“Something has Gone Wrong”: The JFS Case 
and Defining Jewish Identity in the 
Courtroom 
 
HEATHER MILLER RUBENS † 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 1, 2009, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
heard its first case as the newly configured highest judicial authority 
in Great Britain, R(E) v. The Governing Body of JFS1 (hereafter the 
JFS case).  In what seems like an odd choice for the debut of this 
judicial body, the Court took up a particularly contentious case 
involving a dispute over the preferential admissions process at a 
popular Jewish school in London. On the most basic level the judges 
attempted to resolve a dispute involving three particularly difficult 
interrelated questions: (1) who is a Jew; (2) who gets to decide; and 
(3) does the orthodox Jewish practice of determining Jewish status by 
matrilineal descent violate the Race Relations Act of 1976?2 
As will be discussed in this case study, twelve-year-old “M” 
applied for admission to the Jews’ Free School (JFS) in London.  The 
well-regarded Orthodox Jewish school had more applicants than 
seats, and thus JFS employed a policy of giving preference to those 
 
 
†    I wish to thank Peter Danchin, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood, 
and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan for inviting me to prepare this case study as part of 
the Politics of Religious Freedom Project hosted by the University of California, 
Berkeley.  I had the privilege of sharing drafts of this case study with several 
individuals, each of whom offered valuable insights to improve the end result; of 
course all errors are my own. In particular I would like to thank Peter Danchin and 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan as well as my colleagues at the Institute for Christian & 
Jewish Studies (Baltimore, MD): Rosann Catalano, Ilyse Kramer and Christopher 
Leighton. Additionally, I had the pleasure of teaching this case study with the 
Honorable Judge Ellen M. Heller whose commitment to careful legal reasoning, 
and to issues affecting the Jewish community, enriched my revisions of this article. 
1. [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
2. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (U.K.), amended by Race Relations Act, 
2000, c. 34 (U.K), repealed by Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K.). 
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applicants who were “recognised as being Jewish by the Office of the 
Chief Rabbi (OCR).”3 M was denied entry to JFS because he was not 
recognized as Jewish according to Orthodox Jewish standards as 
determined by an Orthodox interpretation of the halacha (Jewish 
law): M would be considered Jewish if his mother was Jewish or if M 
wished to undergo a conversion.4  M did not satisfy the OCR’s 
matrilineal test, and M himself did not wish to undergo an Orthodox 
conversion.5  While M’s father was Jewish by birth, M’s mother had 
converted to Judaism under the supervision of the Masorti Jewish 
rabbinate.6  England’s OCR does not recognize the validity of 
Masorti conversions.7  Thus, according to the OCR, M was not 
Jewish because his mother was not Jewish by OCR standards when 
she gave birth to M.  
M’s father sued JFS, arguing that in utilizing the matrilineal test 
JFS’s admissions policy violated the United Kingdom’s Race 
Relations Act of 1976.8  The British Supreme Court explained that 
while religious discrimination is permissible under British law for 
religious schools, racial discrimination is not under the Race 
Relations Act.  The Court ruled that when JFS utilized the matrilineal 
test the school was engaged in ethnic discrimination, rather than 
religious discrimination.9  As Lady Hale said in the majority 
opinion:  “M was rejected, not because of who he is, but because of 
who his mother is.”10  The Court instructed JFS to establish a new 
test that did not make determinations of Jewish identity based on 
ethnicity, but rather based on practice and belief.  
In England, religious schools are permitted to give admissions 
preference to applicants who share the school’s religious 
affiliation. Usually this preference is a matter of mutual agreement 
between the students and the schools. Yet as this case demonstrates, 
religious communities sometimes disagree about matters of 
communal membership, practice, and observance.  The Orthodox 
Jewish community does not agree with Masorti Jewish interpretations 
 
 
3. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 24 (Lord Phillips). 
4. See id. at ¶ 2 (explaining the “matrilineal test”).   
5. Id. at ¶ 6. 
6. Id. at ¶¶ 6–7.  
7. Id. at ¶ 166 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
8. Id. at ¶ 5 (Lord Phillips). 
9. Id. at  ¶ 41, 45, 50, 51 (Lord Philips); id. at ¶ 66 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 103 
(Lord Mance); id. at ¶ 124 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 148 (Lord Clarke). 
10.  Id. at ¶ 66 (Lady Hale). 
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of the halacha, and does not recognize the authority of Masorti 
Jewish rabbis to perform conversions.11   Until this court decision, the 
OCR, the designated authority over Orthodox Judaism in England, 
instructed Orthodox Jewish schools that a child was considered 
Jewish if he or she was born to a Jewish mother, regardless of his or 
her level of religious observance.  Failing this, a child could also 
apply to undergo a conversion that would be recognized by the 
OCR.  However, in December 2009, the OCR’s matrilineal test was 
declared illegal in JFS.  In the aftermath of this decision, England’s 
Orthodox Jewish schools have had to develop different means of 
determining Jewishness for the admissions process that are no longer 
grounded in their interpretation of the halacha, but rather are 
grounded in an arguably Protestant Christian framework that 
determines religious identity in terms of belief and practice. 
Additionally, this case appears to resolve denominational differences 
on determining Jewish status internal to England’s Jewish 
community, making this apparently secular court the arbiter of a 
religious dispute.  In the wake of the JFS decision, we are left to 
wonder if religious freedom can exist beyond the borders of 
Protestant Christian terms and concepts.     
I.  CONTEXTS 
Is Judaism a religion?  Are Jews a distinct race or ethnicity? Do 
Jews constitute a people or nation?  Is Jewishness a cultural reality? 
As many notable Jewish Studies and Religious Studies scholars have 
shown,12 these questions regarding the status of Judaism and 
Jewishness are historically modern ones. Before the development of 
the nation-state, determining Jewish identity was a relatively 
unambiguous yes/no proposition. For Jews living in the medieval and 
early modern historical periods, these questions simply did not exist 
in distinct spheres – you either were a Jew or you were not a Jew.  So 
 
 
11. See id. at ¶ 181 (Lord Hope, concurring) (“The OCR does not recognize 
the validity of conversions carried out by non-Orthodox authorities, as they do not 
require converts to subscribe fully to the tenets of Orthodox Judaism.”). 
12. See, e.g., LEORA BATNITZKY, HOW JUDAISM BECAME A RELIGION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN JEWISH THOUGHT 1 (2011); JACOB KATZ, TRADITION 
AND CRISIS: JEWISH SOCIETY AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 52−62 (Bernard 
Dov Cooperman trans., Syracuse Univ. Press, 2000); DAVID RUDERMAN, EARLY 
MODERN JEWRY: A NEW CULTURAL HISTORY (2010). 
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what changed all of this? The development of individual citizenship 
and the modern nation state, which involved the reimagining of the 
role of religion and religious laws in political and public life, and the 
status of a person vis-à-vis her community.  
Prior to the eighteenth-century, Jews lived in self-governing, 
politically autonomous Jewish communities under the protection of 
nobilities that permitted their existence. In the medieval and early 
modern period, a Jew would have been born into her Jewish 
community, and her entire life—political, social, religious, cultural—
was lived within that Jewish community. Matters of ritual 
observance, as well as day-to-day social and political concerns, were 
adjudicated by the Jewish community according to Jewish law. Each 
community had its own legal, educational and health systems in place 
to take care of the members of that particular Jewish 
community. Understanding this fully integrated pre-modern Jewish 
community, and its very sparse interaction with other similarly 
situated Christian neighboring communities, helps us better 
comprehend the so-called “Jewish Question” of the modern period.  
With the development of centralized nation states, and the 
dissolution of localized, feudal governance, parsing the status of the 
Jewish community, and the Jewish person, was critical to the self-
fashioning of these new governments. “The Jew” was understood to 
be paradigmatic to the Enlightenment era discussions regarding the 
relationship between the theological and the political. At the heart of 
the debate stood the so-called “Jewish Question”: could a Jew be a 
citizen of the state?  
Some argued no: Jews could not become full participant citizens 
in the emerging European “states” because the Jewish people 
constituted a “state within a state;”13 Jewish communities were 
separate communal entities and Jews would prioritize their allegiance 
to the Jewish community and Jewish law above and against their 
fellow citizens and the laws of the state. Others argued yes: Jews 
could be full citizens of the states where they lived because Judaism 
was principally a religion, and Jewish identity was not communal, but 
rather a matter of individual private praxis that involved personal 
 
 
13. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, A State Within a State (1793), in THE JEW IN 
THE MODERN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309−10 (Paul Mendes-Flohr & 
Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1995). 
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observance of the halacha—that is keeping Jewish law.14 The 
halacha was not to be understood as a competing political or legal 
structure to the State, but rather was apolitical—it simply related to 
regulating religious praxis.15 This position was first argued by Moses 
Mendelsshon in Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and 
Judaism.16 While certainly not all Jews agreed with Mendelssohn’s 
characterization of Judaism and Jewish law, from this point forward, 
the conversation about Jewishness, and Jewish identity, had 
significantly changed. While in the pre-modern period Jews were a 
people, a culture, and a religious community all-in-one, it was now 
possible to articulate a Jewish identity in discrete terms. Jewishness 
could be understood as a religious identity apart from a political 
identity.   Jewishness could also be understood as a cultural heritage, 
devoid of religious content.   Jews could be Jewish, but not keep 
Jewish law or follow any ritual observance.   In large measure, the 
possibilities of understanding Jewish identity in all of these forms 
(and of course, many other derivations) created the environment of 
the JFS case.         
A.  What is religion? 
When one asks the question, “Is Judaism a religion?” there is a 
presumption that “religion” is an identifiable, neutral quantity. Yet as 
Jonathan Z. Smith, Talal Asad, and others have shown, this is not the 
case.17 Tracing the etymology of the term “religion” from its Latin 
 
 
14. The experience of the Jewish communities of Western Europe differed 
from the experience of Jews living in Eastern Europe in large part because of the 
differing political structures.  The Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires were 
formed by a variety of peoples rather than individuals, thus the Jewish community 
remained a corporate unit in Eastern Europe.  As the JFS case occurred in England, 
we have focused attention the changing political and cultural landscape of Western 
Europe, and how that affected Western European Jews.  
15. MOSES MENDELSSOHN, JERUSALEM: OR ON RELIGIOUS POWER AND 
JUDAISM 130 (Allan Arkush trans., 1983). 
16. Id. 
17. See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Smith, A Matter of Class: Taxonomies of Religion, 
89 HARV. THEOLOGICAL R. 387, 393, 397 (1996) (arguing that while the 
classification of religion can be an important scholarly tool, it is often a flawed 
process, not fully encompassing the complexity of religion as a varying concept 
among the world’s people); Talal Asad, Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: 
Reflections on Geertz, 18 MAN 237, 252 (1983) (exploring Clifford Geertz’s essay, 
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origins to its contemporary usage, one quickly learns that the 
meaning of “religion” has evolved over time and that the current 
usage of “religion” is popularly defined in a Protestant Christian 
mode. Religion is seen as the (1) voluntary (2) faith and/or belief of 
(3) an autonomous individual. Religion is a matter of personal choice 
and requires affirmative assent in the form of belief.  This faith is 
manifested in practice and actions. It is my contention that this 
Protestant Christian definition of “religion” is what animates the 
decision of the Majority in the JFS case. This raises the very real 
question of whether one can fault a non-Christian religion for not 
fitting neatly into Christian categories. Indeed, this struggle is not a 
new one, but is also part of the history of the “Jewish Question” in 
the modern period.      
Even while Moses Mendelssohn argued in Jerusalem: Or on 
Religious Power and Judaism that Judaism was a religion, 
Mendelssohn did not hold that religion should be equated with 
voluntary individual belief.18 He writes that “Judaism knows of no 
revealed religion in the sense in which Christians understand this 
term,” and “Judaism boasts no exclusive revelation of eternal truths” 
to which a Jew is required to assent.19  In making these claims 
Mendelssohn aims to demonstrate that Judaism, by requiring no 
belief in dogma, is more compatible with Enlightenment notions of 
reason. But more importantly for our purposes, Mendelssohn is 
presenting a competing definition of “religion” as a result of this 
move. Religion, in his Jewish terms, need not have anything to do 
with belief or personal assent. Rather the Jewish religion involved 
being a member of the Jewish people, upon whom it was incumbent 
to keep the halacha and engage in Jewish practices. 
Since religious schools are allowed to engage in “religious 
discrimination” in their admissions process, defining religion is 
central to understanding the JFS decision. One of the arguments 
made by Didi Herman in her valuable book An Unfortunate 
Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness and English Law is that English 
judicial discourse in the last century have frequently understood Jews 
 
 
“Religion as a Cultural System,” and finding that the concept of religion as a 
universal, cultural phenomenon hinders the understanding of religion by divorcing 
it from the various cultures and social settings from which it emerged and from our 
own personal knowledge and responses).  
18. See MENDELSSOHN, supra note 15, at 89−90, 97. 
19. Id.  
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and Jewishness through a Protestant Christian lens, which has 
resulted in some fundamental misapprehensions about Jews and 
Judaism.20 In her concluding chapters, Herman demonstrates that the 
judgments in the JFS case further demonstrates a Christian bias in 
defining religion.21 In the aftermath of this case, England’s Jewish 
schools have had to create Jewish belief and practice tests to 
determine the Jewish status of the applicant.22 Religious identity is 
defined by voluntary, individual belief. According to the court, 
religion is not, and cannot be, based on collective peoplehood or a 
sense of communal belonging that was not rooted in belief and was 
not the result of one’s own free choice.23 That notion of Jewish 
identity, the court found, was not religion.24 One wonders then if 
there is any true religious freedom that goes beyond the borders of 
Protestant Christian terms.         
 
 
20. See Didi Herman, ‘An Unfortunate Coincidence’: Jews and Jewishness in 
Twentieth-Century English Discourse, 33 J.L & SOC’Y. 277, 300 (2006) (suggesting 
that while other minorities could make the same claim, “the nearly 2000-year 
history of Jewish peoples in England, combined with the role Jews, the ‘Old 
Testament’, and a ‘Jewish State’ play in Christian theology, have produced a very 
particular trajectory of ‘race’ in England,” leaving the area of race studies in the 
English legal system bereft of a well-rounded exploration). 
21. DIDI HERMAN, AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE: JEWS, JEWISHNESS, AND 
ENGLISH LAW (2011). 
22. See infra notes 85−92 and accompanying text; see also R(E) v. Governing 
Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) ¶ 50 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (Lord Phillips) (noting that after the Court of Appeals decision, JFS changed 
its admission policy for September 2010 admissions to examine applicants’ level of 
faith practice through a points system, including such factors as synagogue 
attendance). 
23. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶¶ 69−70 (Lady Hale) (interpreting the Equality Bill and 
U.K. anti-discrimination legislation to preclude a conflation of ethnicity with 
religious practice; noting that while the Jewish law governing ethnicity and people 
has helped its people survive discrimination and persecution for centuries, “no 
other faith schools in [the United Kingdom] adopt descent-based criteria for 
admission” and any allowances for exception “should be made by Parliament”). 
24. See id. at ¶ 45 (Lord Phillips) (“But one thing is clear about the matrilineal 
test; it is a test of ethnic origin. By definition, discrimination that is based upon that 
test is discrimination on racial grounds under the Act.”). 
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B. Judaism(s) in the Modern Period 
Jewish denominationalism as it exists today was also a 
development of the modern period, and tracing its nineteenth century 
development helps illuminate the intra-Jewish conversation central to 
the JFS case.  I discuss Reform Judaism, Orthodox Judaism, and 
Conservative (Masorti)25 Judaism in chronological order.26 
1. Reform Judaism 
Reform Judaism is the first of the Jewish responses to the 
changing cultural and political landscape of the modern 
period. Reform Judaism began in Germany in the nineteenth century 
when a few Jewish rabbi-scholars began to modify Jewish ritual and 
observance. These modifications were based upon the belief that 
while core teachings were revealed by God to Moses at Mt. Sinai, 
Judaism had been (and continued to be) an evolving religious 
tradition. In brief, Judaism was subject to historical change and thus 
Judaism could be modified to respond to the current historical 
moment. The ability to reinterpret halacha and modify observance 
further allowed the Jewish communities of western Europe to 
“confine” their Jewishness to a religious sphere as they began to 
embrace their emerging rights as citizens in the newly forming nation 
states.  
2.  Orthodox Judaism 
In opposition to the emergence of Reform Judaism, several 
Jewish rabbis rejected the notion that Judaism was subject to 
historical change and that observance of the halacha could be 
reinterpreted or modified. These Jews did not wish to see Judaism 
diminished to the status of religion and confined to spending Sabbath 
at the synagogue. Rather they understood Jewish identity and Jewish 
observance of the halacha to fully encompass the life of the 
individual. Yet even while holding that the halacha could not be 
modified, these newly identified Orthodox Jews understood 
themselves to also be fully compatible with the emerging political 
and cultural changes occurring in Europe—they did not believe that 
 
 
25. In the United States and Canada, this movement is known as Conservative 
Judaism. In Israel, England, and elsewhere in the world, it is known as Masorti 
Judaism. 
26. This is not an exhaustive list of the various expressions of Judaism 
available (e.g. Reconstructionist) but rather aims to highlight the three numerically 
largest segments of the Jewish population.  
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their observance of the halacha would be in conflict with political 
and cultural developments.        
3.  Conservative (Masorti) Judaism 
Chronologically, Conservative (Masorti) Judaism was the third 
Jewish response to modernity, and these rabbis and Jewish leaders 
sought middle ground between Reform and Orthodox iterations of 
Judaism. Originally known as “Positive-Historical Judaism,” this 
strand of Jewish belief and observance did not embrace the full extent 
of the changes posed by some Reform Jewish leaders (for example, 
many wanted to keep Hebrew language central, as well as observe a 
kosher diet), yet at the same time they did not reject the historical-
critical approach to Jewish history and what adopting those told 
meant for understanding the halacha (e.g. they were open to the 
possibility of changes to ritual observance).    
4. Denominationalism and the JFS Case 
The rise of Jewish denominationalism and the possibility of 
choosing whether to be Jewish is a modern phenomenon. Each of the 
Jewish communities (as well as other iterations of Jewish identity not 
explored here) has a different method for determining Jewish status 
and Jewish membership, and the communities do not agree about 
those parameters.   The two central questions to this case are: (1) who 
should set the parameters for Jewish status; and (2) how should those 
membership guidelines be established?   
C.  The Education System in England 
Prior to 1870, schooling in England was done on an ad hoc basis 
exclusively by religious communities. Principally, schools were built 
and run by the Church of England, although other religious groups, 
such as Jews and Roman Catholics, also built their own schools. By 
1870, the religious communities had not been able to open a 
sufficient number of schools to meet the education needs of all of 
England’s children. Hence the Elementary Education Act of 1870 
was passed to allow government to build and run elementary schools 
where such schools were needed.27 The existing religious schools 
continued to operate as before. Government’s first foray into building 
 
 
27. Elementary Education Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.). 
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a school system was to “fill-in-the-gaps”—to have the government 
provide schools in regions inadequately served by religious 
schools. These new government built-and-run schools became 
popularly known as “provided schools” or “board schools,” as they 
were provided and operated by school boards. From this point 
forward, a dual system of religious and government schools in 
England formally came into being. All subsequent discussions of 
elementary education reform in Great Britain deal with this dual 
system of religious and government schools. Since the 1950s, both 
religious and government schools receive government funds, and 
most contemporary discussions of education reform continue to 
debate the role of government funding and oversight for religious 
schools.  
II.     JUDGMENTS (EDITED AND ANNOTATED) 
All nine judges wrote separate judgments for this case, 
demonstrating the complexity of the issues under consideration, as 
well as the nuanced differences in judicial reasoning utilized by the 
judges in crafting their judgments. With such a large number of legal 
voices, it is unsurprising that certain judges explicated various 
sections of this case more comprehensively, and with more clarity, 
than others. As a result, I have chosen to not use just one judgment in 
this case study, but have drawn from several judgments in order to 
make the JFS case, and the legal and religious questions it raises, 
accessible to a wide readership.  After each extended excerpt I note 
the quoted judge. 
A. Factual Background 
1.  JFS—A Brief History of the School & the School’s Mission 
While almost all the judges restated the facts of this case, Lord 
Hope’s exposition is comprehensive of the major issues.  The 
following are excerpts from Lord Hope’s opinion: 
JFS, formerly the Jewish Free School, is a voluntary 
aided comprehensive secondary school which is 
maintained by the local authority, the London 
Borough of Brent. It has a long and distinguished 
history which can be traced back to 1732. It has over 
2000 pupils, and for more than the past 10 years it has 
been over-subscribed. It regularly has twice the 
number of applicants for the places that are available. 
Clause 8 of its Instrument of Government dated 18 
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October 2005 provides: 
“Statement of School Ethos 
Recognising its historic foundation, JFS will preserve 
and develop its religious character in accordance with 
the principles of orthodox Judaism, under the guidance 
of the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew 
Congregations of the Commonwealth. The School 
aims to serve its community by providing education of 
the highest quality within the context of Jewish belief 
and practice. It encourages the understanding of the 
meaning of the significance of faith and promotes 
Jewish values for the experience of all its pupils.” 
Further information is given by the school on its 
website, which states: 
“The outlook and practice of the School is Orthodox. 
One of our aims is to ensure that Jewish values 
permeate the School. Our students reflect the very 
wide range of the religious spectrum of British Jewry. 
Whilst two thirds or more of our students have 
attended Jewish primary schools, a significant number 
of our Year 7 intake has not attended Jewish schools 
and some enter the School with little or no Jewish 
education. Many come from families who are totally 
committed to Judaism and Israel; others are unaware 
of Jewish belief and practice. We welcome this 
diversity and embrace the opportunity to have such a 
broad range of young people developing Jewish values 
together.” 
The culture and ethos of the school is Orthodox 
Judaism. But there are many children at JFS whose 
families have no Jewish faith or practice at all.28  
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:  Lord Hope’s final comment here 
illuminates an underlying conceptual challenge for the judges 
 
 
28. R(E) v. Governing Board of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 
(S.C.) ¶ 164 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hope, concurring). 
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throughout the case.  While there are many children at JFS whose 
families have no “faith” or “practice” in the opinion of the court, they 
are still considered to be Jewish by the Orthodox Chief Rabbi and the 
Orthodox Jewish community. Can there be an Orthodox Jewish 
atheist? Why would JFS, and the Orthodox Jewish community, have 
an interest in educating such a child? Why is this concept difficult for 
the Court to address? Could this difficulty arise because such a 
category does not map easily onto Christian norms? Who defines 
what “religion” is? 
There are a variety of Judaisms practiced today all over the 
world (Reconstructionst, Reform, Conservative, Masorti, Orthodox, 
etc.). Should legal courts recognize the very real differences between 
these communities in understanding Jewish identity? Would you 
expect the court to recognize the real differences between various 
Christians (Presbyterian, Methodist, Roman Catholic, Anglican, 
Evangelical, Mormon, etc.) and their various interpretations of 
Christian identity? Should matters of community membership be 
determined by “secular” courts or by the communities themselves?  
2. JFS Admissions Policy & Criteria for Determining Jewish 
Status 
As mentioned in the introduction, religious schools are permitted 
to give admissions preference to applicants who share the school’s 
religious affiliation. Within the Jewish community, conversion and 
matrilineal descent have been two main ways of determining Jewish 
status for centuries.29 This case deals with both aspects: the mother’s 
Masorti (and not Orthodox) conversion is part of the dispute, as well 
as the question of whether one should consider maternal status at all 
when determining the Jewish identity of a child. It is important to 
note that while some Reform Jewish communities have interpreted 
halacha to include patrilineal descent as well matrilineal descent in 
determining Jewish status in the modern period, no Jewish 
community has ever entirely rejected parental descent as a marker for 
Jewish identity. The identity of the parents continues to be essential 
in discussion of the identity of the child in all Jewish communities. 
Patrilineal/matrilineal descent as a marker for Jewishness has no real 
analogue to other religious frameworks, making it challenging for the 
judges to comprehend. Below is Lord Hope’s engagement with the 
 
 
29. Id. at ¶ 182 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 248 (Lord Brown, dissenting). 
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issue of determining Jewish identity according to Orthodox Jewish 
standards:               
Prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal in this 
case the principal admissions criterion of JFS was that, 
unless undersubscribed, it would admit only children 
who were recognised as being Jewish by the OCR. Its 
policy for the year 2008/09, which can be taken to be 
the same as that for the year in question in this case, 
was as follows: 
“It is JFS (“the School”) policy to admit up to the 
standard admissions number children who are 
recognised as being Jewish by the Office of the Chief 
Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregation of the 
Commonwealth (OCR) or who have already enrolled 
upon or who have undertaken, with the consent of 
their parents, to follow any course of conversion to 
Judaism under the approval of the OCR.” 
The Chief Rabbi is the head of the largest groups of 
Orthodox synagogues in the United Kingdom. But he 
does not represent all Orthodox communities, nor does 
he represent the Masorti, Reform and Progressive 
Jewish communities. In accordance with Jewish law, 
the OCR recognises as Jewish any child who is 
descended from a Jewish mother. The mother herself 
must be descended from a Jewish mother or must have 
been converted to Judaism before the birth of the child 
in a manner recognised as valid by the OCR. Such a 
child is recognised by the OCR as Jewish regardless of 
the form of Judaism practised by the family 
(Orthodox, Masorti, Reform or Progressive). He is so 
recognised even if the entire family has no Jewish 
faith or observance at all. A family may be entirely 
secular in its life and outlook. Its members may be 
atheists or even be practising Christians or practising 
Muslims. Yet, if the child was himself born of a 
Jewish mother, he will be recognised as Jewish by the 
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OCR and eligible for a place at JFS.30  
3. M’s Jewish Status—According to the OCR & Self-
Identification  
These proceedings have been brought in relation to a 
child, M on the application of his father, E. M’s father 
is of Jewish ethnic origin. M’s mother is Italian by 
birth and ethnic origin. Before she married E she 
converted to Judaism under the auspices of a non-
Orthodox synagogue. Her conversion is recognised as 
valid by the Masorti, Reform and Progressive 
Synagogues. But it was undertaken in a manner that is 
not recognised by the OCR. She and E are now 
divorced and M lives mainly with his father. He and 
his father practise Judaism, and they are both members 
of the Masorti New London Synagogue. M practices 
his own Jewish faith, prays in Hebrew, attends 
synagogue and is a member of a Jewish Youth Group. 
But the OCR does not recognise him as of Jewish 
descent in the maternal line. His mother is not 
recognised as Jewish by the OCR and he has not 
undergone, or undertaken to follow, a course of 
approved Orthodox conversion. 
Consequently he was unable to meet the school’s 
criterion for admission. In April 2007 he was refused a 
place at JFS for year 7 in the academic year 2007-
2008.31  
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:  Since JFS is an Orthodox Jewish 
school that recognizes the authority of the OCR in Jewish matters, 
should the school be forced to recognize other Jewish authorities? 
Would you apply the same criterion to Christian schools—should a 
Roman Catholic school be forced to accept a Presbyterian or a Latter-
Day-Saints student applicant as part of its preferential pool because 
all parties are arguably Christian? Who should make this 
determination?     
 
 
30. Id. at ¶ 165 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
31. Id. at ¶ 166. 
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B. Procedural Background 
E, on behalf of M, sought to appeal the admissions decision, 
utilizing first the internal appeals process available to him at the 
school.32 When that process failed, and M was still denied 
preferential admissions, E next appealed to the civil courts arguing 
that in utilizing the test of matrilineal descent to deny E Jewish status, 
JFS was in violation of the Race Relations Act of 1976.33 Lord 
Phillips described the posture of the case when it arrived in the 
Supreme Court: 
E failed in these judicial review proceedings in which 
he challenged the admissions policy of JFS before 
Munby J, but succeeded on an appeal to the Court of 
Appeal. The question of M’s admission has already 
been resolved between the parties, but the Governing 
Body of JFS is concerned at the finding of the Court 
of Appeal that the school’s admissions policy 
infringes the 1976 Act, as are the United Synagogue 
and the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and 
Families. Indeed this case must be of concern to all 
Jewish faith schools which have admissions policies 
that give preference to Jews.34 
It is important to note that E & M are not disputing the right of 
the Jewish school to give preferential admissions treatment to 
Jews. Rather they are disputing the School’s use of Orthodox Jewish 
standards, in accordance with the Office of the Chief Rabbi, to 
determine Jewish status, which determines eligibility for the 
admissions preference.35 E & M are making the claim that in 
conferring Jewish status according to Orthodox standards that utilize 
matrilineal descent the school is in violation of the Race Relations 
Act and that the school must find another method of determining 
Jewish status.36  
 
 
32. Id. at ¶ 167. 
33. Id. at ¶¶ 167−68. 
34. Id. at ¶ 7 (Lord Phillips). 
35. Id. at ¶ 6. 
36. Id. at ¶ 7. 
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: If JFS had utilized a different 
criterion to distinguish between the Orthodox and Masorti Jewish 
communities, and in effect excluded M from the school, by saying 
that M did not qualify for a place because he was a practicing Masorti 
Jew, and not an Orthodox Jew, would that have changed the Court’s 
ruling? Would that have changed the Court’s willingness to even take 
up the case? What would have happened to the school’s stated 
interest in educating secular and atheist Jewish children whose 
families have no affiliation with synagogues?   
C. The Race Relations Act of 1976 
The following are excerpts from the relevant laws under 
consideration for these judgments. First is the relevant portion of the 
Race Relations Act of 1976. It is important to note that the judges 
understood the test of Jewish matrilineal descent to be a test 
concerning “ethnic origins” as defined by Section 3 of this Act.37  
Section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976 defines race 
discrimination. It was amended by the Race Relations 
Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI 
2003/1626) which, implementing Council Directive 
2000/43 EC of 29 June 2000, rewrote in European 
terms the concept of indirect discrimination. So far as 
material it provides as follows: 
“(1) A person discriminates against another in any 
circumstances relevant for the purposes of any 
provision of this Act if – 
(a) on racial grounds he treats that other less 
favourably than he treats or would treat other 
persons …  
(1A) A person also discriminates against another if, in 
any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any 
provision referred to in subsection (1B), he applies to 
that other a provision, criterion or practice which he 
applies or would apply equally to persons not of the 
same race or ethnic or national origins as that other, 
but – 
 
 
37. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 3 (U.K.); id. at ¶ 190 (Lord Hope, 
concurring). 
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(a) which puts or would put persons of the same 
race or ethnic or national origins as that other at a 
particular disadvantage when compared with 
other persons, 
(b) which puts or would put that other at that 
disadvantage, and 
(c) which he cannot show to be a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.” 
… 
 
Section 3 of the 1976 Act provides: 
“(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires 
– 
‘racial grounds’ means any of the following grounds, 
namely colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national 
origins; 
‘racial group’ means a group of persons defined by 
reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or 
national origins, and references to a person’s racial 
group refer to any racial group into which he falls. 
(2) The fact that a racial group comprises two or more 
distinct racial groups does not prevent it from 
constituting a particular racial group for the purposes 
of this Act. 
… 
(4) A comparison of the case of a person of a 
particular racial group with that of a person not of that 
group under section 1(1) or (1A) must be such that the 
relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or 
not materially different, in the other.”38  
 
 
38. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶¶ 170−71. 
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: What would you surmise is the 
purpose of this 1976 Act: to combat racism and other acts of 
discrimination grounded on racial, ethnic, religious or national 
stereotypes, or to categorize certain persons in the UK by racial, 
ethnic, religious, or national groups? Let’s say a group of young men 
assaulted another man because they believed him to be Muslim. The 
victim of the assault was not in fact Muslim, but Sikh. Does the 
actual identity of the victim matter or rather does the intention of the 
group of young men (racial animus) matter? How would this analogy 
apply to the JFS case?      
D. The Religious Charter of Schools Regulations 
Next, the Court recognized the ability of religious schools to 
give admissions preference to those applicants who are identified as 
being members of that religion. However, the Court noted that the 
faith-based criteria applied to the applicants must not be in violation 
of any other discriminatory legislation. 
Paragraphs 2.41-2.43 of the School Admissions Code 
for 2007 deals with faith-based oversubscription 
criteria. Paragraph 2.41 states that schools designated 
by the Secretary of State as having a religious 
character (faith schools) are permitted by section 50 of 
the Equality Act 2006 to use faith-based 
oversubscription criteria in order to give priority in 
admission to children who are members of, or who 
practise, their faith or denomination. It also states that 
faith-based criteria must be framed so as not to 
conflict with other legislation such as equality and 
race relations legislation [emphasis added]. 
Paragraph 2.43 of the 2007 Code states: 
“It is primarily for the relevant faith provider group or 
religious authority to decide how membership or 
practice is to be demonstrated, and, accordingly, in 
determining faith-based oversubscription criteria, 
admission authorities for faith schools should only use 
the methods and definitions agreed by their faith 
provider group or religious authority.” 
Paragraph 2.47 states: 
“Religious authorities may provide guidance for the 
admission authorities of schools of their faith that sets 
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out what objective processes and criteria may be used 
to establish whether a child is a member of, or whether 
they practise, the faith. The admission authorities of 
faith schools that propose to give priority on the basis 
of membership or practice of their faith should have 
regard to such guidance, to the extent that the 
guidance is consistent with the mandatory provisions 
and guidelines of this Code.”39  
E.    The Legal Questions 
To restate, under British Law religious schools (even those who 
accept government funding) are allowed to give preference in 
admissions to students who are members of the school’s religious 
community.40 JFS, as a government recognized Jewish school, is 
allowed to give admissions preference to Jews. What is under 
question in this case is whether the method (i.e. Jewish status as 
determined by the Office of the Chief Rabbi which means either 
conversion recognized by Orthodox authorities, or matrilineal descent 
from a woman recognized as Jewish by the Orthodox authorities) 
utilized by the JFS admissions committee to determine whether or not 
an applicant is Jewish is a religious test, and thus permissible, or an 
ethnic test, and thus an impermissible violation of the Race Relations 
Act.   
There were two forms of unlawful discrimination under the Race 
 
 
39.  Id. at ¶¶ 176−77. 
40. Current British Law is governed by the Equality Act of 2010, which states 
that unless a school falls under the Special Schools Exception, it shall be held to the 
discrimination standard established under the Act. See Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 
85(7)(b) (U.K.). The Secretary of State is empowered to create a code regulating 
school admission policies. See School Standards and Framework Act, 1998, c. 31, § 
84(1)−(2) (U.K.). This code, known as the “School Admission Code,” outlines the 
criteria for faith-based oversubscription admission policies. The 2007 code was in 
place during the decision of JFS. DEP’T. EDUC., SCH. ADMISSIONS. CODE, §§ 
2.18−2.20 (2007). School Admissions Code 2012, in force since Feb. 1, 2012, is 
the current guidance and it deals with faith-based oversubscription in schools with 
a  religious character.  DEP’T. EDUC., SCH. ADMISSIONS CODE, §§ 1.36−1.38 (2012). 
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Relations Act: direct and indirect discrimination.41  In trying to 
determine whether the test of matrilineal descent was a religious or 
an ethnic test, the judges utilized this distinction in an attempt to 
narrowly define the legal question at hand, as direct and indirect 
discrimination are understood to be “mutually exclusive” by the 
judges in the majority.42  The majority of the Court found the 
admissions process utilizing matrilineal descent to be in direct 
violation of the Act, thus absolving the court from discussing the 
issue of indirect discrimination.43   
In summing up the majority’s position to limit its decision to 
determining whether direct discrimination occurred, Lord Philips 
wrote:   
It is common ground that JFS discriminated against M 
in relation to its terms of admission to the school. The 
issue of whether this amounted to unlawful direct 
discrimination on racial grounds depends on the 
answer to two questions: (1) What are the grounds 
upon which M was refused entry? (2) Are those 
grounds racial?44 
Lady Hale summarizes the distinction between direct and 
indirect discrimination as determined by precedent. 
The basic difference between direct and indirect 
discrimination is plain…The rule against direct 
discrimination aims to achieve formal equality of 
treatment: there must be no less favourable treatment 
between otherwise similarly situated people on 
grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or 
national origins. Indirect discrimination looks beyond 
formal equality towards a more substantive equality of 
results: criteria which appear neutral on their face may 
have a disproportionately adverse impact upon people 
of a particular colour, race, nationality or ethnic or 
 
 
41. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, §§ 1(1)(a)−1(1)(b) (U.K.) (amended 
2000); see JFS, 15 UKSC at § 78, 93 (Lord Mance) (discussing direct and indirect 
discrimination). 
42. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 57 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 237 (Lord Walker, concurring). 
43. Id. at ¶ 51 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 71 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 103 (Lord 
Mance); id. at ¶ 123 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 154 (Lord Clarke).  
44. Id. at ¶ 12 (Lord Phillips). 
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national origins. 
Direct and indirect discrimination are mutually 
exclusive. You cannot have both at once. As 
Mummery LJ explained in Elias, at para 117, “The 
conditions of liability, the available defences to 
liability and the available defences to remedies differ.” 
The main difference between them is that direct 
discrimination cannot be justified. Indirect 
discrimination can be justified if it is a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
But it is significant that section 57(3) provides that, in 
respect of the earlier form of indirect discrimination 
under section 1(1)(b), “no award of damages shall be 
made if the respondent proves that the requirement or 
condition in question was not applied with the 
intention of treating the claimant unfavourably on 
racial grounds.” We are concerned with the later form 
of indirect discrimination, under section 1(1A), to 
which section 57(3) does not apply, but the fact that 
this exception to the available remedies was made 
suggests that Parliament did not consider that an 
intention to discriminate on racial grounds was a 
necessary component of either direct or indirect 
discrimination. One can act in a discriminatory 
manner without meaning to do so or realising that one 
is. Long-standing authority at the highest level 
confirms this important principle.45  
Two cases are key to the court’s understanding of direct 
discrimination: R v Birmingham City Council, ex p. Equal 
Opportunities Commission46 and James v Eastleigh Borough 
 
 
45. Id. at ¶¶ 56−57 (Lady Hale). 
46. [1989] 1 A.C. 1155 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that the 
Council’s merit-based admission policy for single-sex schools constituted unlawful 
discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 because female students 
had to ultimately earn higher marks in the entry exams than male students). 
2014]    THE JFS CASE AND DEFINING JEWISH IDENTITY 389 
 
Council.47 Both involve sex discrimination by local government 
authorities.48 In R v Birmingham admission to a selective single-sex 
grammar school was at issue: 
As is well known, there were more grammar school 
places for boys than for girls in Birmingham with the 
result that girls had to do better than boys in the 
entrance examination in order to secure a place. The 
council did not mean to discriminate. It bore the girls 
no ill will. It had simply failed to correct a historical 
imbalance in the places available. It was nevertheless 
guilty of direct discrimination on grounds of sex.49 
In a quotation from the James v. Eastleigh B.C. opinion, Lord 
Phillips points out the language that has come to stand in for the 
judicial logic: would someone have received different treatment “but 
for” his sex/race/age/religion?50 If yes, direct discrimination has 
occurred: 
“There is discrimination under the statute if there is 
less favourable treatment on the ground of sex, in 
other words if the relevant girl or girls would have 
received the same treatment as the boys but for their 
sex.”51 
  In James v. Eastleigh B.C., entrance to a public swimming 
pool was free for all persons who were of pensionable age, which 
was 60 for women and 65 for men.52 In utilizing pension age to 
determine the cost of swimming, the court found the council engaged 
in direct discrimination of men by refusing to provide swimming 
facilities.53 
 
 
47. [1990] 2 A.C. 751 (H.L.) (finding the Council’s policy of allowing free 
entry to citizens of pensionable age as a discrimination based upon gender as 
pensionable age for females is 60 years of age and the age for men is 65 years of 
age). 
48. Birmingham, [1989] 1 A.C. at 1155; James, [1990] 2 A.C. at 751. 
49. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 58 (Lady Hale). 
50. Id. at ¶ 16 (Lord Phillips) (citing Lord Goff’s judgment from James, 2 A.C. 
at 765, as outlining a “but for” question in identifying the factual criterion at the 
basis of the discrimination). 
51. Id. at ¶ 13 (emphasis added) (quoting R v. Birmingham City Council, ex p. 
Equal Opportunities Commission, [1989] A.C. 1155, 1194 (U.K.)). 
52. James, [1990] 2 A.C. at 751. 
53. Id. at 782. 
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The Council discriminated between men and women, 
aged between 60 and 65, in relation to the terms on 
which they were admitted to swim in a leisure centre 
run by the Council. Women in this age band were 
admitted free whereas men had to pay an entry charge. 
The motive for this discrimination could perhaps be 
inferred by the manner in which this rule was 
expressed, namely that those of pensionable age were 
to be admitted free of charge; women became of 
pensionable age when they were 60, men when they 
were 65. Counsel for the Council explained . . . that 
the council’s reason for giving free access to those of 
pensionable age was that their resources were likely to 
have been reduced by retirement. The Court of Appeal 
had treated this motive as being the relevant “ground” 
for discriminating in favour of women and against men 
rather than the factual criterion for discrimination, 
which was plainly the sex of the person seeking 
admission to the centre.54 
In both of these cases, the Court ruled that the girls in R v 
Birmingham City Council and the men in James v. Eastleigh B.C. 
suffered direct discrimination because of their sex.55 The majority 
found in both cases that the individuals were treated differently “but 
for” their sex.56 These decisions, in the opinion of Lord Phillips, were 
based upon an evaluation of the criteria used in making a decision 
and not upon a motive for that decision: 
The contrast between the reasoning of the majority 
and of the minority in this case is, I believe, clear. I 
find the reasoning of the majority compelling. 
 
 
54. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 14 (Lord Phillips) (citing James, [1990] 2 A.C. at 758) 
(distinguishing the Court of Appeals’ treatment of motive for discrimination from 
the factual criterion required to determine discrimination). 
55. Birmingham, [1989] 1 A.C. at 1196−97 (Lord Goff); James, [1990] 2 AC. 
at 782; see also JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 20 (Lord Phillips) (stating that discrimination 
should be based on the factual criterion applied, rather than the motive for the 
discrimination). 
56. Birmingham, [1989] 1 A.C. at 1196−97 (Lord Goff); James, [1990] 2 A.C. 
at 782; see also JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 20 (Lord Phillips). 
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Whether there has been discrimination on the ground 
of sex or race depends upon whether sex or race was 
the criterion applied as the basis for discrimination. 
The motive for discriminating according to that 
criterion is not relevant.57 
Indeed, it is this legal logic that undergirds the majority’s 
decision in this case and radically differentiates the thinking of the 
majority from the minority.58  
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: Does the “but for” test apply to 
issues of membership when the categories are ambiguous? Or more 
aptly for the JFS case, does the “but for” distinction work when the 
issue at hand is that of a religious community when the dispute is 
happening within that community? The examples given for this “but 
for” test work around the existence of distinct/discrete groups 
(men/women, boys/girls) but do not seem to apply when two groups 
are claiming to have one (shared?) identity. In other words, unlike the 
JFS case, determining whether an individual was a man or a woman 
was not the central dispute to these precedent cases. Thus, I suggest 
the precedents might be entirely unhelpful. Does the “but for” test 
help, or hinder, a discussion of determining discrimination in cases 
where the category of identity itself is contested?  
1.  Determining “Racial Grounds”: Jewish Identity as Ethnicity 
Of course a key part of determining whether or not direct 
discrimination occurred in violation of the Race Relations Act rests 
upon how the court understands the term “racial grounds.” And in the 
specific context of the JFS case, the Court must grapple with how it 
understands Jewishness in terms of the category of race. All the 
judges, as well as both E & M and JFS, agree that a Jewish ethnic 
group exists for the purposes of this Act.59 Yet at the same time, both 
the Court and the litigants also recognize Jewishness as a religious 
category as well.60 In determining who is an ethnic Jew, one also 
must attend to religious definitions as well.   
JFS argued to the Court that there was indeed a Jewish ethnic 
 
 
57. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 20 (Lord Phillips). 
58. See infra Part II.C. 
59. See, e.g., JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 38 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 67 (Lady Hale); id. 
at ¶ 121 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 183 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
60. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 2 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 76 (Lord Mance). 
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group according to the Act.61 However, the school argued that at the 
same time there was also a Jewish religious group and that these two 
groups were not coterminous.62 The school argued that this dispute 
over admissions had to do with the recognition of the validity of the 
mother’s conversion—that she had undergone a Masorti Jewish 
conversion not recognized by the Orthodox Jewish community.63 
Thus, this was a religious dispute and was a question of the Orthodox 
Jewish religious community determining its own standards for 
membership members through religious law. 
The precedent utilized by the Court when considering how to 
define ethnic groups was set in Mandla v. Dowell Lee.64 Lord Phillips 
explains this case, as well as how the lawyers arguing for JFS 
understand its applicability to this dispute: 
I shall summarise the case advanced by Lord Pannick 
QC for JFS in my own words. There exists a Jewish 
ethnic group. Discrimination on the ground of 
membership of this group is racial discrimination. The 
criteria of membership of this group are those 
identified by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Mandla v 
Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548. In that case a 
declaration was sought that refusing admission to a 
school of a Sikh wearing a turban was indirect racial 
discrimination. The critical question was whether 
Sikhs comprised a “racial group” for the purposes of 
the 1976 Act. It was common ground that they were 
not a group defined by reference to colour, race, 
nationality or national origins. 
It was contended, however, that they were a group 
defined by “ethnic origins.” In considering the 
meaning of this phrase, Lord Fraser at pp 561–562 
 
 
61. Id. at ¶ 242 (Lord Brown, concurring). 
62. Id. at ¶ 76 (Lord Mance). 
63. Id. at ¶ 6 (Lord Phillips). 
64. [1983] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) (U.K.) (finding a private school’s refusal to admit 
a Sikh student who refused to cease wearing a turban and to cut his hair a case of 
indirect discrimination, and developing a seven-factor test in analyzing ethnicity); 
JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 28. 
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referred to a meaning of “ethnic” given by the 
Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary (1972): 
“pertaining to or having commo§n racial, cultural, 
religious, or linguistic characteristics, esp. designating 
a racial or other group within a larger system…” His 
comments in relation to this definition have been set 
out in full by Lord Mance at paragraph 83 of his 
judgment and as Lord Mance remarked they merit 
reading in full. It suffices, however, to cite the passage 
at p. 562 where Lord Fraser set out the seven 
characteristics, some of which he held would be 
shared by, and would be the touchstone of, members 
of an ethnic group: 
“The conditions which appear to me to be essential are 
these: (1) a long shared history, of which the group is 
conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and 
the memory of which it keeps alive; (2) a cultural 
tradition of its own, including family and social 
customs and manners, often but not necessarily 
associated with religious observance. In addition to 
those two essential characteristics the following 
characteristics are, in my opinion, relevant; (3) either a 
common geographical origin, or descent from a small 
number of common ancestors; (4) a common 
language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a 
common literature peculiar to the group; (6) a 
common religion different from that of neighbouring 
groups or from the general community surrounding it; 
(7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a 
dominant group within a larger community, for 
example a conquered people (say, the inhabitants of 
England shortly after the Norman conquest) and their 
conquerors might both be ethnic groups. 
A group defined by reference to enough of these 
characteristics would be capable of including converts, 
for example, persons who marry into the group, and of 
excluding apostates. Provided a person who joins the 
group feels himself or herself to be a member of it, 
and is accepted by other members, then he is, for the 
purposes of the Act, a member.” 
 [. . .] 
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It is possible today to identify two different cohorts [of 
Jews], one by the Mandla criteria and one by the 
Orthodox criteria. The cohort identified by the Mandla 
criteria forms the Jewish ethnic group. They no longer 
have a common geographical origin or descent from a 
small number of common ancestors, but they share 
what Lord Fraser regarded as the essentials, a long 
shared history, of which the group is conscious as 
distinguishing it from other groups and the memory of 
which it keeps alive and a cultural tradition of its own, 
including family and social customs and manners, 
often but not necessarily associated with religious 
observance. The man in the street would recognise a 
member of this group as a Jew, and discrimination on 
the ground of membership of the group as racial 
discrimination. The Mandla group will include many 
who are in the cohort identified by the Orthodox 
criteria, for many of them will satisfy the matrilineal 
test. But there will be some who do not. 
So far as the cohort identified by the Orthodox test is 
concerned, many of these will also fall within the 
Mandla group. But there will be some, indeed many, 
who do not. Most of these will be descendants from 
Jewish women who married out of and abandoned the 
Jewish faith. They will not satisfy the two vital criteria 
identified by Lord Fraser. Indeed, they may be 
unaware of the genetic link that renders them Jewish 
according to the Orthodox test. 
Thus, in Lord Pannick’s submissions the Orthodox test is not one 
that necessarily identifies members of the Jewish ethnic group. It is a 
test founded on religious dogma and discrimination on the basis of 
that test is religious discrimination, not racial discrimination.65  
2.  The Role of the Chief Rabbi: Jewish Identity as Religious 
As mentioned, JFS stated that the school would recognize an 
applicant as Jewish if that applicant would also be recognized as 
 
 
65. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 30−32 (Lord Phillips). 
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Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi. The Court claims that it 
takes no issue with a religious school utilizing the guidance of a 
religious authority in determining religious community 
membership.66 Rather the majority focuses narrowly on whether the 
particular standards given by the Chief Rabbi to JFS to determine 
Orthodox Jewish identity were discriminatory on racial grounds.67 
Implicit in this limiting move is a judicial evaluation of both the 
authority of the Chief Rabbi, as well as a judicial evaluation of the 
religious tenets espoused by the Chief Rabbi. While the Court wants 
to get itself out of the business of evaluating the content of religion, it 
seems to be doing just that. 
But for the purposes of clarity, below are excerpts of how 
various judges understood both the position of the Chief Rabbi and 
the advice given to JFS by the Chief Rabbi. Lord Hope provides a 
useful summary of the Chief Rabbi’s guidance to JFS on determining 
Jewish identity: 
In connection with JFS’s admissions for the year 2009 an 
application form, Application for Confirmation of Jewish Status, was 
issued by the OCR. Parents were required to select from the 
following options: 
“(a) I confirm that the child’s biological mother is 
Jewish by birth. 
(b) I confirm that the child’s biological mother has 
converted to Judaism. 
(c) I confirm that the child is adopted [in which case 
the child’s Jewish status must be separately verified].” 
The guidance notes to the application form state: 
“Jewish status is not dependent on synagogue 
affiliation per se, though Jewish status will not be 
confirmed if the child, or any of his/her maternal 
antecedents, converted to Judaism under non-orthodox 
auspices.  
 
 
66. Id. at ¶ 75 (Lord Mance) (noting that Equality Act of 2006, § 50(1) 
exempts schools having a religious character under the 1998 School Standards and 
Framework Act from the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of 
religious belief). 
67. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 27 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 65 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 127 
(Lord Clarke). 
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If the child’s parents were not married under orthodox 
auspices, further investigation will be necessary before 
confirmation of Jewish status is issued. This usually 
entails obtaining additional documentary evidence 
down the maternal line.” 
If the child’s mother was not herself born to a Jewish 
mother but converted to Judaism before the birth of 
the child, further inquiries are undertaken by the OCR 
before it is prepared to recognise the child as Jewish. 
The OCR does not recognise the validity of 
conversions carried out by non-Orthodox authorities, 
as they do not require converts to subscribe fully to the 
tenets of Orthodox Judaism. 
The exacting process that is indicated by the wording 
of the application form is firmly rooted in Orthodox 
Jewish religious law. Religious status is not dependent 
on belief, religious practice or on attendance at a 
synagogue. It is entirely dependent upon descent or 
conversion. It depends on establishing that the person 
was born to a Jewish mother or has undergone a valid 
conversion to Judaism. That is a universal rule that 
applies throughout all Orthodox Judaism. M’s 
ineligibility for admission to JFS was due to the fact 
that different standards are applied by the Chief Rabbi 
from those applied by the Masorti, Reform and 
Progressive communities in the determining of a 
person’s religious status. Nothing that I say in this 
opinion is to be taken as calling into question the right 
of the OCR to define Jewish identity in the way it 
does. I agree with Lord Brown that no court would 
ever dictate who, as a matter of Orthodox religious 
law, is to be regarded as Jewish. Nor is it in doubt that 
the OCR’s guidance as to the effect of Orthodox 
Jewish religious law was given in the utmost good 
faith. The question that must now be faced is a 
different question. It is whether it discriminates on 
racial grounds against persons who are not recognised 
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by the OCR as Jewish.68 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: The Court and all parties to the 
lawsuit agree that Jewish identity is both an ethnic identity and a 
religious identity. The central challenge of this case is to disentangle 
the religious from the ethnic in determining making their judgments, 
as religious discrimination is permissible, while racial discrimination 
is not.  The issue then, is this—do you think the matrilineal test is a 
religious test or a racial one? Or is it both? Is the Court the best place 
to adjudicate such a decision? 
3. Legal Outcomes—The Court’s Ruling 
The Court decided that the JFS Admissions Requirements that 
determined Jewish status by matrilineal descent was in violation of 
the Race Relations Act of 1976.69 Five of the judges determined that 
utilizing matrilineal descent was an example of direct racial 
discrimination in violation of the Race Relations Act;70 two judges 
determined that utilizing matrilineal descent was an example of 
indirect racial discrimination, which are not justified, in violation of 
the Race Relations Act; 71 and two judges determined that utilizing 
matrilineal descent was not racial discrimination but instead was 
religious discrimination.72 The same two judges found that, even if 
the policy was indirect racial discrimination, discrimination was for a 
legitimate purpose and was proportionate to that purpose.73 
The judges found this case to be legally vexing, as is 
demonstrated by the fact that all nine judges wrote an opinion voicing 
the distinct legal warrants for their interpretation of the facts and the 
limits—or lack thereof—of judicial reach into the religious arena. 
While the selected four excerpts below do not attempt to capture 
the nuance of each of the nine opinions, they summarize the basic 
contours of the four outcomes of this case in the judges’ own words.        
 
 
68. Id. at ¶¶ 181−82 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
69. Id. at ¶ 45 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 71 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 86 (Lord 
Mance); id. at ¶ 117 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 136 (Lord Clarke). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at ¶ 218 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 235 (Lord Walker, 
concurring). 
72. Id. at ¶ 230 (Lord Rodger, concurring); id. at ¶ 242 (Lord Brown, 
dissenting). 
73. Id. at ¶ 233 (Lord Rodger, concurring); id. at ¶ 256 (Lord Brown, 
dissenting).  
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i. The Majority: JFS’s Admissions Requirements are Direct   
Racial Discrimination (Lord Phillips, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, 
Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke) 
While each judge chose to write his or her own opinion, there is 
a basic shared logic to all the judges who found the admissions policy 
of JFS to be an example of direct racial discrimination. Namely, all 
are operating within a significantly narrow judicial scope: is the 
criteria used to determine Jewish status an example of racial/ethnic 
test?  In this narrow realm, the context for the matrilineal descent test 
is irrelevant, as is the motive for applying the matrilineal test. Rather, 
the judges chose to limit their examination simply to the “factual 
criteria” of the test itself.  
  Lady Hale summarizes this position:     
This case is concerned with discrimination on account 
of “ethnic origins.” And the main issue is what that 
means—specifically, do the criteria used by JFS to 
select pupils for the school treat people differently 
because of their “ethnic origins”? 
My answer to that question is the same as that given 
by Lord Phillips, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr and Lord 
Clarke and for the same reasons. That we have each 
written separate opinions underlines the fact that we 
have each reached the same conclusion through a 
process of independent research and reasoning. It is 
only because the debate before us and between us has 
called in question some fundamental principles of 
discrimination law that I feel it necessary to underline 
them yet again. 
. . .  
There is absolutely no doubt about why the school 
acted as it did. We do not have to ask whether they 
were consciously or unconsciously treating some 
people who saw themselves as Jewish less favourably 
than others. Everything was totally conscious and 
totally transparent. M was rejected because he was not 
considered to be Jewish according to the criteria 
adopted by the Office of the Chief Rabbi. We do not 
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need to look into the mind of the Chief Rabbi to know 
why he acted as he did. If the criterion he adopted 
was, as in Birmingham or James, in reality ethnicity-
based, it matters not whether he was adopting it 
because of a sincerely held religious belief. No-one 
doubts that he is honestly and sincerely trying to do 
what he believes that his religion demands of him. But 
that is his motive for applying the criterion which he 
applies and that is irrelevant. The question is whether 
his criterion is ethnically based. 
So at long last I arrive at what, in my view, is the only 
question in this case. Is the criterion adopted by the 
Chief Rabbi, and thus without question by the school, 
based upon the child’s ethnic origins? In my view, it 
clearly is. M was rejected because of his mother’s 
ethnic origins, which were Italian and Roman 
Catholic. The fact that the Office of the Chief Rabbi 
would have over-looked his mother’s Italian origins, 
had she converted to Judaism in a procedure which 
they would recognise, makes no difference to this 
fundamental fact. M was rejected, not because of who 
he is, but because of who his mother is. That in itself 
is not enough. If M had been rejected because his 
mother shopped in Waitrose rather than Marks and 
Spencer, that would not have been because of her or 
his ethnicity. But it was because his mother was not 
descended in the matrilineal line from the original 
Jewish people that he was rejected. This was because 
of his lack of descent from a particular ethnic group. 
In this respect, there can be no doubt that his ethnic 
origins were different from those of the pupils who 
were admitted. It was not because of his religious 
beliefs. The school was completely indifferent to 
these. They admit pupils who practise all 
denominations of Judaism, or none at all, or even 
other religions entirely, as long as they are 
halachically Jewish, descended from the original 
Jewish people in the matrilineal line. 
There is no doubt that the Jewish people are an ethnic 
group within the meaning of the Race Relations Act 
1976. No Parliament, passing legislation to protect 
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against racial discrimination in the second half of the 
twentieth century, could possibly have failed to protect 
the Jewish people, who had suffered so unspeakably 
before, during and after the Holocaust. If Parliament 
had adopted a different model of protection, we would 
not be here today. Parliament might have adopted a 
model of substantive equality, allowing distinctions 
which brought historically disadvantaged groups up to 
the level of historically advantaged groups. But it did 
not do so. It adopted a model of formal equality, 
which allows only carefully defined distinctions and 
otherwise expects symmetry. A man must be treated 
as favourably as a woman, an Anglo-Saxon as 
favourably as an African Caribbean, a non-Jew as 
favourably as a Jew. Any differentiation between 
them, even if it is to redress historic disadvantage, 
must be authorised by legislation. 
This means that it is just as unlawful to treat one 
person more favourably on the ground of his ethnic 
origin as it is to treat another person less favourably. 
There can be no doubt that, if an employer were to 
take exactly the same criterion as that used by the 
Office of the Chief Rabbi and refuse to employ a 
person because the Chief Rabbi would regard him as 
halachically Jewish, the employer would be treating 
that person less favourably on grounds of his ethnic 
origin. As Lord Kerr explains, there can be no logical 
distinction between treating a person less favourably 
because he does have a particular ethnic origin and 
treating him less favourably because he does not. 
Some may feel that discrimination law should modify 
its rigid adherence to formal symmetry and recognise 
a greater range of justified departures than it does at 
present.  There may or may not be a good case for 
allowing Jewish schools to adopt criteria which they 
believe to be required by religious law even if these 
are ethnically based. As far as we know, no other faith 
schools in this country adopt descent-based criteria for 
admission. Other religions allow infants to be admitted 
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as a result of their parents’ decision. But they do not 
apply an ethnic criterion to those parents. The 
Christian Church will admit children regardless of 
who their parents are. Yet the Jewish law has enabled 
the Jewish people and the Jewish religion to survive 
throughout centuries of discrimination and 
persecution. The world would undoubtedly be a poorer 
place if they had not. Perhaps they should be allowed 
to continue to follow that law. 
But if such allowance is to be made, it should be made 
by Parliament and not by the courts’ departing from 
the long-established principles of the anti-
discrimination legislation. The vehicle exists in the 
Equality Bill, which completed its committee stage in 
the House of Commons in the 2008-09 session and 
will be carried over into the 2009-10 session. The 
arguments for and against such a departure from the 
general principles of the legislation could then be 
thoroughly debated. The precise scope of any 
exception could also be explored. We know from the 
helpful intervention of the Board of Deputies of 
British Jews that the Masorti, Reform and Liberal 
denominations of Judaism have welcomed the result, 
if not the reasoning, of the decision of the Court of 
Appeal and would not wish for the restoration of the 
previous admission criteria. That is a debate which 
should not be resolved in court but by Parliament. We 
must not allow our reluctance to enter into that debate, 
or to be seen to be imposing our will upon a 
wellmeaning religious body, to distort the well settled 
principles of our discrimination law. That is to allow 
the result to dictate the reasoning. 
This was, in my view, a clear case of direct 
discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin. It follows 
that, however justifiable it might have been, however 
benign the motives of the people involved, the law 
admits of no defence.74  
 
 
74. Id. at ¶¶ 54−55, 65−71 (Lady Hale). 
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ii. Concurring in the Result: JFS’s Admissions Requirements are 
Indirect Racial Discrimination (Lord Hope, Lord Walker) 
Lord Hope and Lord Walker both found the admissions policy of 
JFS to be in violation of the Race Relations Act, but unlike the 
majority, they refused to examine the test of Jewish status by 
matrilineal descent apart from its religious context.75 In bringing the 
religious factor back into the legal discussion, and expanding the 
scope of judicial view slightly, Judges Hope and Walker still found 
that the admissions policy was discriminatory, but indirectly so.76 
Lord Hope wrote: 
At one level there is no dispute about the reason why 
M was denied admission to JFS. The school’s 
admissions policy was based on the guidance which it 
received from the OCR. Thus far the mental processes 
of the alleged discriminator do not need to be 
examined to discover why he acted as he did. The 
dispute between the parties is essentially one of 
categorisation: was the OCR’s guidance given on 
grounds of race, albeit for a religious reason, or was it 
solely on religious grounds? For JFS, Lord Pannick 
QC submits that M failed only because JFS was giving 
priority to members of the Jewish faith as defined by 
the religious authority of that faith, which was a 
religious criterion. That was the ground of the 
decision. The Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that 
the ground was that M was not regarded as of Jewish 
ethnic origin, and that the theological reasons for 
taking this view was the motive for adopting the 
criterion: para 29. For E, Ms Rose submits that Lord 
Pannick’s submissions confused the ground for the 
decision with its motive. The ground spoke for itself. 
It was that M was not regarded according to Orthodox 
 
 
75. See id. at ¶ 204 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 235 (Lord Walker, 
concurring). 
76. Id. at ¶ 218 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 235 (Lord Walker, 
concurring). 
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Jewish principles as Jewish. This meant that he was 
being discriminated against on grounds relating to his 
ethnicity. This was racial discrimination within the 
meaning of the statute. 
These contradictory assertions must now be resolved. I 
wish to stress again that the issue is not simply 
whether M is a member of a separate ethnic group 
from those who are advantaged by JFS’s admissions 
policy. That is not where the argument in this case 
stops. I agree with Lord Rodger that the decision of 
the majority which, as it respectfully seems to me, 
does indeed stop there leads to extraordinary results. 
As he puts it in para 226, one cannot help feeling that 
something has gone wrong. Lord Brown makes the 
same point when, in para 247 he stresses the 
importance of not expanding the scope of direct 
discrimination and thereby placing preferential 
treatment which could be regarded as no more than 
indirectly discriminatory beyond the reach of possible 
justification. The crucial question is whether M was 
being treated differently on grounds of that ethnicity. 
The phrase “racial grounds” in section 1(1)(a) of the 
1976 Act requires us to consider what those words 
really mean—whether the grounds that are revealed by 
the facts of this case can properly be described as 
“racial”. Only if we are satisfied that this is so would it 
be right for this Court to hold that this was 
discrimination on racial grounds. 
… 
Here the discrimination between those who are, and 
those who are not, recognized as Jewish was firmly 
and inextricably rooted in Orthodox Jewish religious 
law which it is the duty of the Chief Rabbi to interpret 
and apply. The Chief Rabbi’s total concentration on 
the religious issue, to the exclusion of any 
consideration of ethnicity, can be illustrated by two 
contrasting examples. Several similar examples were 
referred to in the course of argument. A is the child of 
parents, and the grandchild of grandparents, all of 
whom led wholly secular lives similar to those of their 
largely secular neighbours. They never observed 
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Jewish religious law or joined in the social or cultural 
life of the Jewish communities where they lived, but 
there is unimpeachable documentary evidence that 
more than a century ago the mother of A’s maternal 
grandmother was converted in an Orthodox 
synagogue. To the OCR A is Jewish, despite his 
complete lack of Jewish ethnicity. By contrast B is the 
child of parents, and the grandchild of grandparents, 
all of whom have faithfully observed Jewish religious 
practices and joined actively in the social and cultural 
life of the Jewish community, but there is 
unimpeachable documentary evidence that more than 
a century ago the mother of B’s maternal grandmother 
was converted in a non-Orthodox synagogue. To the 
OCR B is not Jewish, despite his obvious Jewish 
ethnicity. Descent is only necessary because of the 
need, in these examples, to go back three generations. 
But having gone back three generations, the OCR 
applies a wholly religious test to what has been 
identified as the critical event. For the reasons given 
by Lord Rodger, the part that conversion plays in this 
process is crucial to a proper understanding of its true 
nature. It cannot be disregarded, as Lady Hale 
suggests in para 66, as making no difference. It shows 
that the inquiry is about a religious event to be decided 
according to religious law. 
For these reasons I would hold that the decision that 
was taken in M’s case was on religious grounds only. 
This was not a case of direct discrimination on racial 
grounds. On this issue, in respectful agreement with 
Lord Rodger, Lord Walker and Lord Brown, I would 
set aside the decision reached by the Court of Appeal. 
… 
In my opinion, for the reasons that Lord Brown gives 
in paras 252-253, JFS has shown that its aim is a 
legitimate one. The essential point is that a faith 
school is entitled to pursue a policy which promotes 
the religious principles that underpin its faith. It is 
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entitled to formulate its oversubscriptions criteria to 
give preference to those children whose presence in 
the school will make it possible for it to pursue that 
policy. The legitimacy of the policy is reinforced by 
the statutory background. It has not emerged out of 
nowhere. It has been developed in accordance with the 
Code which permits faith schools to define their 
conditions for admission by reference either to 
membership of the faith or to practice. The 
justification for the Code lies exclusively in a belief 
that those who practise the faith or are members of it 
will best promote the religious ethos of the school. In 
Orphanos v Queen Mary College [1985] AC 761, 
772–773 Lord Fraser said that a typical example of a 
requirement which could be justified without regard to 
the nationality or race of the person to whom it was 
applied was Panesar v Nestlé Co Ltd (Note) [1980] 
ICR 144, where it was held that a rule forbidding the 
wearing of beards in the respondent’s chocolate 
factory was justifiable on hygienic grounds 
notwithstanding that the proportion of Sikhs who 
could conscientiously comply with it was considerably 
smaller than the proportion of non-Sikhs who could 
comply with it. It was, he said, purely a matter of 
public health and nothing whatever to do with racial 
grounds. I would apply the same reasoning to this 
case. 
This leaves, however, the question of proportionality. 
The Court of Appeal, having concluded that the 
criterion did not have an aim that was legitimate, did 
not attempt to examine this issue: para 47. Before 
Munby J it was submitted by Ms Rose that JFS’s 
admissions policy did not properly balance the impact 
of the policy on those like M adversely affected by it 
and the needs of the school: para 199. He rejected this 
argument for two reasons. One was that the kind of 
policy that is in question in this case is not materially 
different from that which gives preference in 
admission to a Muslim school to those who were born 
Muslim or preference in admission to a Catholic 
school to those who have been baptised. The other was 
that an alternative admissions policy based on such 
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factors as adherence or commitment to Judaism would 
not be a means of achieving JFS’s aims and 
objectives: paras 200-201. In my opinion these reasons 
miss the point to which Ms Rose’s submission was 
directed. The question is whether putting M at a 
disadvantage was a proportionate means of achieving 
the aim of the policy. It was for JFS to show that they 
had taken account of the effect of the policy on him 
and balanced its effects against what was needed to 
achieve the aim of the policy. As Peter Gibson LJ 
noted in Barry v Midland Bank plc [1999] ICR 319, 
335–336 the means adopted must be appropriate and 
necessary to achieving the objective. 
I do not think that JFS have shown that this was so. 
Lord Pannick submitted that there was no other way of 
giving effect to the policy. If the school were to admit 
M, this would be to deny a place to a child who was 
regarded as Jewish by the OCR. This was inevitable as 
the school was oversubscribed. But what is missing is 
any sign that the school’s governing body addressed 
their minds to the impact that applying the policy 
would have on M and comparing it with the impact on 
the school. As Ms Rose pointed out, the disparate 
impact of the policy on children in M’s position was 
very severe. They are wholly excluded from the very 
significant benefit of state-funded education in 
accordance with their parents’ religious convictions, 
whereas there are alternatives for children recognised 
by the OCR although many in the advantaged group 
do not share the school’s faith-based reason for giving 
them priority. The school claimed to serve the whole 
community. But the way the policy was applied 
deprived members of the community such as M, who 
wished to develop his Jewish identity, of secondary 
Jewish education in the only school that is available. 
There is no evidence that the governing body gave 
thought to the question whether less discriminatory 
means could be adopted which would not undermine 
the religious ethos of the school. Consideration might 
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have been given, for example, to the possibility of 
admitting children recognised as Jewish by any of the 
branches of Judaism, including those who were 
Masorti, Reform or Liberal. Consideration might have 
been given to the relative balance in composition of 
the school’s intake from time to time between those 
recognised as Jewish by the OCR who were 
committed to the Jewish religion and those who were 
not, and as to whether in the light of it there was room 
for the admission of a limited number of those 
committed to the Jewish religion who were recognised 
as Jewish by one of the other branches. Ms Rose said 
that the adverse impact would be much less if a 
different criterion were to be adopted. But the same 
might be true if the criterion were to be applied less 
rigidly. There may perhaps be reasons, as Lord Brown 
indicates (see para 258), why solutions of that kind 
might give rise to difficulty. But, as JFS have not 
addressed them, it is not entitled to a finding that the 
means that it adopted were proportionate. 
… 
The problem that JFS faces in this case is a different 
one, as the context is different. Under section 1(1A)(c) 
of the Race Relations Act 1976 the onus is on it to 
show that the way the admissions policy was applied 
in M’s case was proportionate. It is not for the court to 
search for a justification for it: see Mummery LJ’s 
valuable and instructive judgment in R (Elias) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2006] 1 WLR 3213, 
paras 131–133. JFS failed to discharge its duty under 
section 71 of the Act to have regard to the need to 
eliminate discrimination. It is having to justify 
something that it did not even consider required 
justification. The question, as to which there is no 
obvious answer either way, was simply not addressed. 
As a result the court does not have the statistical or 
other evidence that it would need to decide whether or 
not the application of the policy in M’s case was 
proportionate. It may well be, as Lord Brown 
indicates, that devising a new oversubscriptions policy 
that is consistent with the school’s legitimate aim 
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would be fraught with difficulty. But it was for JFS to 
explore this problem and, having done so, to 
demonstrate that whatever policy it came up with was 
proportionate. So, although I do not arrive at this 
conclusion by the same route as Lord Mance, I agree 
with him that on the material before the Court the 
admissions policy cannot be held to have been 
justified. 
I would hold that, by applying the oversubscription 
criteria to M in a way that put him at a particular 
disadvantage when compared with others not of the 
same ethnicity by reason of matrilineal descent, JFS 
discriminated against him in breach of section 1(1A) 
of the Race Relations Act 1976, and that E is entitled 
to a declaration to that effect.77   
iii. The Dissent: JFS’s Admissions Requirements are not Direct 
Discrimination, but Permitted Religious Discrimination (Lord 
Rodger, Lord Brown)  
Lord Rodger and Lord Brown found that this case principally 
involves a religious dispute between two Jewish communities and 
thus this is not a dispute that a secular court should resolve.78 Their 
determination that this dispute is religious, and not racial, depends 
heavily upon a different understanding of the facts of the case, and 
the grounds for the admissions decision.  Lord Rodger wrote: 
The purpose of designating schools as having a 
religious character is not, of course, to ensure that 
there will be a school where Jewish or Roman 
Catholic children, for example, can be segregated off 
to receive good teaching in French or physics. That 
would be religious discrimination of the worst kind 
which Parliament would not have authorised. Rather, 
the whole point of such schools is their religious 
character. So the whole point of designating the 
 
 
77. Id. at ¶¶ 187−88, 203−04, 209−12, 214−15 (Lord Hope, concurring). 
78. Id. at ¶¶ 224−25 (Lord Rodger, dissenting); id. at ¶¶ 239, 248–249 (Lord 
Brown, dissenting). 
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Jewish Free School as having a Jewish character is 
that it should provide general education within a 
Jewish religious framework. More particularly, the 
education is to be provided within an Orthodox 
religious framework. Hence the oversubscription 
admission criteria adopted after consulting the Chief 
Rabbi. The School’s policy is to give priority to 
children whom the Orthodox Chief Rabbi recognises 
as Jewish. From the standpoint of Orthodoxy, no other 
policy would make sense. This is because, in its eyes, 
irrespective of whether they adhere to Orthodox, 
Masorti, Progressive or Liberal Judaism, or are not in 
any way believing or observant, these are the 
children—and the only children—who are bound by 
the Jewish law and practices which, it is hoped, they 
will absorb at the School and then observe throughout 
their lives. Whether they will actually do so is, of 
course, a different matter. 
The dispute can be summarised in this way. E, who is 
himself a Masorti Jew, wants his son, whom he 
regards as Jewish, to be admitted to the School as a 
Jewish child. He complains because the School, whose 
admission criteria provide that only children 
recognised as Jewish by the Office of the (Orthodox) 
Chief Rabbi are to be considered for admission, will 
not consider admitting his son, who is recognised as 
Jewish by the Masorti authorities but not by the Chief 
Rabbi. If anything, this looks like a dispute between 
two rival religious authorities, the Office of the Chief 
Rabbi and the Masorti authorities, as to who is Jewish. 
But E claims—and this Court will now declare—that, 
when the governors refused to consider M for 
admission, they were actually treating him less 
favourably than they would have treated a child 
recognised as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi 
“on racial grounds”: Race Relations Act 1976, section 
1(1)(a). 
The decision of the majority means that there can in 
future be no Jewish faith schools which give 
preference to children because they are Jewish 
according to Jewish religious law and belief. If the 
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majority are right, expressions of sympathy for the 
governors of the School seem rather out of place since 
they are doing exactly what the Race Relations Act 
exists to forbid: they are refusing to admit children to 
their school on racial grounds. That is what the 
Court’s decision means. And, if that decision is 
correct, why should Parliament amend the Race 
Relations Act to allow them to do so? Instead, Jewish 
schools will be forced to apply a concocted test for 
deciding who is to be admitted. That test might appeal 
to this secular court but it has no basis whatsoever in 
3,500 years of Jewish law and teaching. 
The majority’s decision leads to such extraordinary 
results, and produces such manifest discrimination 
against Jewish schools in comparison with other faith 
schools, that one can’t help feeling that something has 
gone wrong. 
The crux of the matter is whether, as the majority 
hold, the governors actually treated M less favourably 
on grounds of his ethnic origins. They say the 
governors did so, but for a bona fide religious motive. 
If that is really the position, then, as Lord Pannick QC 
was the first to accept on their behalf, what the 
governors did was unlawful and their bona fide 
religious motive could not make the slightest 
difference. But to reduce the religious element in the 
actions of those concerned to the status of a mere 
motive is to misrepresent what they were doing. The 
reality is that the Office of the Chief Rabbi, when 
deciding whether or not to confirm that someone is of 
Jewish status, gives its ruling on religious grounds. 
Similarly, so far as the oversubscription criteria are 
concerned, the governors consider or refuse to 
consider children for admission on the same religious 
grounds. The only question is whether, when they do 
so, they are ipso facto considering or refusing to 
consider children for admission on racial grounds. 
Lady Hale says that M was rejected because of his 
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mother’s ethnic origins which were Italian and Roman 
Catholic. I respectfully disagree. His mother could 
have been as Italian in origin as Sophia Loren and as 
Roman Catholic as the Pope for all that the governors 
cared: the only thing that mattered was that she had 
not converted to Judaism under Orthodox auspices. It 
was her resulting non-Jewish religious status in the 
Chief Rabbi’s eyes, not the fact that her ethnic origins 
were Italian and Roman Catholic, which meant that M 
was not considered for admission. The governors 
automatically rejected M because he was descended 
from a woman whose religious status as a Jew was not 
recognised by the Orthodox Chief Rabbi; they did not 
reject him because he was descended from a woman 
whose ethnic origins were Italian and Roman Catholic. 
As in any complaint of racial discrimination, the point 
can be tested by reference to the appropriate 
comparator. The starting point is that both E and M 
believe M to be Jewish by descent. So E applied to the 
School to admit M on the basis that he was Jewish 
because his Italian Catholic mother had converted to 
Judaism before he was born. The mother’s Jewish 
status as a result of her conversion was accordingly 
the only issue which the governors were asked to 
consider or did consider. They refused E’s application 
because her conversion had been under non-Orthodox 
auspices. Therefore the appropriate comparator is a 
boy with an Italian Catholic mother whom the 
governors would have considered for admission. He 
could only be a boy whose mother had converted 
under Orthodox auspices. The question then is: did the 
governors treat M, whose mother was an Italian 
Catholic who had converted under non-Orthodox 
auspices, less favourably than they would have treated 
a boy, whose mother was an Italian Catholic who had 
converted under Orthodox auspices, on grounds of his 
ethnic origins? Plainly, the answer is: No. The ethnic 
origins of the two boys are exactly the same, but the 
stance of the governors varies, depending on the 
auspices under which the mother’s conversion took 
place. 
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Faced with a boy whose mother had converted under 
Orthodox auspices, the governors would have 
considered him for admission without pausing for a 
single second to enquire whether he or his mother 
came from Rome, Brooklyn, Siberia or Buenos Aires, 
whether she had once been a Roman Catholic or a 
Muslim, or whether he or she came from a close-knit 
Jewish community or had chosen to assimilate and 
disappear into secular society. In other words, the 
“ethnic origins” of the child or his mother in the 
Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 sense would 
not have played any part in the governors’ decision to 
admit him. All that would have mattered was that his 
mother had converted under Orthodox auspices. 
Equally, in M’s case, the governors did not refuse to 
consider admitting him on grounds of his Mandla 
ethnic origins. Even supposing that the governors 
knew about his origins, they were quite irrelevant and 
played no part in their decision. The governors were 
simply asked to consider admitting him as the son of a 
Jewish mother. They declined to do so because his 
mother had not converted under Orthodox auspices. It 
was her non-Orthodox conversion that was crucial. In 
other words, the only ground for treating M less 
favourably than the comparator is the difference in 
their respective mothers’ conversion—a religious, not 
a racial, ground.79 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: In allowing religious schools to 
practice religious discrimination in their admissions process, while 
prohibiting other forms of discrimination, the government is pressed 
to make a working definition of religion for these schools.  In each of 
the above opinions what is the operating definition of religion, 
generally? Of Judaism in particular? Who determines those terms?   
 
 
79. Id. at ¶¶ 223–30 (Lord Rodger, dissenting). 
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iv. The Dissent: JFS’s Policy was Legally Permissible Indirect 
Discrimination for a Legitimate Reason, Through 
Proportionate Means (Lord Rodger, Lord Brown) 
The two dissenting judges, Lord Brown and Lord Rodger, 
having found no direct discrimination, went on to consider indirect 
discrimination. Lord Brown doubted whether even indirect 
discrimination had occurred,80 but found that, if it had, discrimination 
was for a legitimate reason and was proportionate.81 Lord Rodger, 
concurring with Brown succinctly stated the reasoning: 
The aim of the School, to instill Jewish values into 
children who are Jewish in the eyes of Orthodoxy, is 
legitimate. And, from the standpoint of an Orthodox 
school, instilling Jewish values into children whom 
Orthodoxy does not regard as Jewish, at the expense 
of children whom Orthodoxy does regard as Jewish, 
would make no sense. That is plainly why the 
School’s oversubscription policy allows only for the 
admission of children recognised as Jewish by the 
Office of the Chief Rabbi. I cannot see how a court 
could hold that this policy is a disproportionate means 
of achieving the School’s legitimate aim.82 
Lord Brown expanded on the question of legitimacy, 
highlighting the religious nature of JFS’s objective in admitting no 
practicing, but halachically Jewish students: 
The legitimacy of JFS’s aim is surely clear. Here is a 
designated faith school, understandably concerned to 
give preference to those children it recognises to be 
members of its religion, but so oversubscribed as to be 
unable to admit even all of these. The School 
Admissions Code expressly allows admission criteria 
based either on membership of a religion or on 
practice. JFS have chosen the former. Orthodox Jews 
regard education about the Jewish faith as a 
fundamental religious obligation. Unlike proselytising 
faiths, however, they believe that the duty to teach and 
 
 
80. See id. at ¶ 250 (Lord Brown, dissenting). 
81. Id. at ¶ 256. 
82. Id. at ¶ 233 (Lord Rodger, dissenting). 
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learn applies only to members of the religion, because 
the obligations in question bind only them.83  
Lord Brown found JFS’s policy proportionate for two reasons, 
which he quoted from the judgment of the High Court: 
Given JFS’s legitimate aim of educating children 
recognised to be Jewish, is their policy of invariably 
giving preference to these children over those not so 
recognised a proportionate means of achieving that 
aim? Answering that question in the affirmative, 
Munby J, in the course of a lengthy, impressive and to 
my mind convincing judgment, said this:  
“[. . .] Two quite separate considerations drive me to 
this conclusion. In the first place, the kind of 
admissions policy in question here is not, properly 
analysed, materially different from that which gives 
preference in admission to a Moslem school to those 
who were born Moslem or preference in admission to 
a Catholic school to those who have been baptised. 
But no-one suggests that such policies, whatever their 
differential impact on different applicants, are other 
than a proportionate and lawful means of achieving a 
legitimate end. Why, [counsel] asks rhetorically, 
should it be any different in the case of Orthodox 
Jews? . . . I agree. Indeed, the point goes even wider 
than the two examples I have given for, as [counsel] 
submits, if E’s case on this point is successful then it 
will probably render unlawful the admission 
arrangements in a very large number of faith schools 
of many different faiths and denominations.  
[. . .] The other point is that made both by the Schools 
Adjudicator and by [counsel for JFS]. Adopting some 
alternative admissions policy based on such factors as 
adherence or commitment to Judaism (even assuming 
that such a concept has any meaning for this purpose 
in Jewish religious law) would not be a means of 
 
 
83. Id. at ¶ 252 (Lord Brown, dissenting). 
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achieving JFS’s aims and objectives; on the contrary it 
would produce a different school ethos. If JFS’s 
existing aims and objectives are legitimate, as they 
are, then a policy of giving preference to children who 
are Jewish applying Orthodox Jewish principles is, 
they say, necessary and proportionate—indeed, as it 
seems to me, essential—to achieve those aims. . . JFS 
exists as a school for Orthodox Jews. If it is to remain 
a school for Orthodox Jews it must retain its existing 
admissions policy; if it does not, it will cease to be a 
school for Orthodox Jews. Precisely. To this argument 
there is, and can be, no satisfactory answer.” 
I find myself in full agreement with all of that.84  
III. RESPONSES TO RULING/CURRENT STATUS 
In the aftermath of the JFS decision, Jewish schools across the 
United Kingdom had to develop new means of determining Jewish 
status for the admissions process that did not make determinations of 
Jewish identity based on ethnicity. As a result, Orthodox Jewish 
schools have created “Jewish Religious Practice Tests.”85 A little 
more than six months after the JFS decision, London’s Jewish 
Chronicle reported that as a result of this admissions test innovation, 
a Jewish applicant was denied admission at a different Jewish school 
because she failed the school’s newly crafted Jewish religious 
practice test.86 Kayleigh Chapple had applied for admission to King 
David High School in Liverpool, England. Like JFS, King David 
grants admissions preference for Jewish students. There were ninety 
spots available, and ten Jewish applicants who potentially qualified 
for the admissions preference. Kayleigh was the only Jewish 
applicant denied admission to the Orthodox Jewish school because 
her family could not satisfy the “Jewish Religious Practice 
Test.”87 Kayleigh was born of a Jewish mother, making Kayleigh 
 
 
84. Id. at ¶¶ 255−56 (Lord Brown, dissenting) (quoting R(E) v. Governing 
Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535 (Admin), [2008] ACD 87, ¶¶ 200−01 (Munby, 
J.)). 
85. Riazat Butt, Jewish Faith Schools Introduce Religious Observance Tests, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 28, 2009, at Educ. 1. 
86. Jonathan Kalmus, Jewish Girl’s King David Places Goes to Non-Jew, 
JEWISH CHRONICLE (June 11, 2010), http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-
news/32947/jewish-girls-king-david-place-goes-non-jew. 
87. Id. 
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Jewish according to Orthodox law and the Chief Rabbi. Indeed, 
Kayleigh’s mother is even an alumna of King David. However, the 
Chappelle family is not religiously observant.88  The family initially 
threatened to sue because Kayleigh has been denied the preferential 
admission to King David that the Chief Rabbi has instructed she 
deserves. Kayleigh was eventually accepted at a different Jewish 
school in Manchester, and the Chapple family decided to not pursue 
legal action.89 
For the 2013 admissions process, applicants to JFS must 
complete a “Certificate of Religious Practice” form in order to be 
eligible for preferred admissions status.90 According to the form, 
applicants may accumulate “points” by attending synagogue services, 
engaging in formal Jewish education, or engaging in a Jewish 
communal or welfare organization.91 Synagogue attendance must be 
verified by a rabbi or another synagogue official for the form.92 
CONCLUSION: “SOMETHING HAS GONE WRONG”: JEWISH      
IDENTITY IN PROTESTANT CHRISTIAN TERMS 
Lord Rodger, writing a strong dissenting opinion in JFS states:   
The decision of the majority means that there can in 
future be no Jewish faith schools which give 
preference to children because they are Jewish 
according to Jewish religious law and belief. . . . 
Instead, Jewish schools will be forced to apply a 
concocted test for deciding who is to be 
admitted.  That test might appeal to this secular court 
but it has no basis whatsoever in 3,500 years of Jewish 
 
 
88. Id. 
89. Jonathan Kalmus, Girl Denied Faith School Place Treks 60 Miles, JEWISH 
CHRONICLE (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/37973/girl-
denied-faith-school-place-treks-60-miles. 
90. JEWISH FREE SCH., ADMISSION POLICY 2014/15 (2013), available at 
http://www.jfs.brent.sch.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/JFS%20Admissions%20
Policy%202014-15.pdf. 
91. JEWISH FREE SCH., CERTIFICATE OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE (2013), available 
at http://www.jfs.brent.sch.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/11%2B%20CRP%202 
014.pdf. 
92. Id. 
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law and teaching.  The majority’s decision leads to 
such extraordinary results, and produces such manifest 
discrimination against Jewish schools in comparison 
with other faith schools, that one can’t help feeling 
that something has gone wrong.93  
I agree with Lord Rodger that something went wrong with the 
Majority ruling in the JFS decision – but what exactly? I think that 
both Lord Rodger and the Majority believe the Court is operating in a 
secular space, and that the term “religion” used in a legal context is 
not defined by a particular religious idiom. However, I hold that the 
results of the JFS case point to a more complicated reality for legally 
defined religion, and demonstrates the limits of religious freedom for 
religious minorities. 
The main task before the Court was to evaluate whether the 
Orthodox Jewish practice of determining Jewish status through 
matrilineal descent was a test of racial or religious discrimination.  If 
it is a racial test, then it is illegal, but if it is a religious test, then it is 
legally protected.  But what if it is both? What if an ethnic test is 
religion? Indeed, as the JFS case shows this is not a what-if scenario, 
but points to a specifically Jewish definition of religion that lacks a 
Christian analog. 
The Majority in the JFS case is working with a very specific 
definition of religion that has been shaped by Protestant Christianity.  
As I stated above, religion for the Majority is seen as the (1) 
voluntary (2) faith and/or belief of (3) an autonomous 
individual. Religion is a matter of personal choice and requires 
affirmative assent in the form of belief. It is my contention that this 
Protestant Christian definition of “religion” is what animates the 
decision of the Majority in the JFS case, and why the Majority do not 
understand how the little boy “M,” who self-identifies as Jewish, 
speaks Hebrew, and regularly attends synagogue, could not be Jewish 
according to Orthodox Jewish standards. Indeed, when the same 
school regularly admits children as Jewish, with little to no Jewish 
education or regular religious practice, the judges were somewhat 
confounded. In a Protestant Christian frame, M’s belief, practice, and 
self-identification would indicate him as religiously Jewish; the 
 
 
93. R(E) v. Governing Board of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 
(S.C.), ¶¶ 225–26 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hope, concurring) (emphasis 
added).  
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religious status of M’s mother would not matter. The Majority could 
not accommodate the Orthodox Jewish practice of identifying Jewish 
children through their mother as religion.  This was not religion in 
their view, but an ethnic test, and thus was not legally permissible.  
The result of the JFS case draws our attention to a challenging 
question: are the definitions of religion operating in the courtrooms of 
America and Europe de facto Christian definitions? If yes, as this 
case suggests, what are the legal remedies for non-Christian religious 
minorities who have beliefs, practices, and religious realities that go 
beyond the Christian definitions? Is it possible to articulate a legal 
definition of religion that is not grounded in a particular religious 
framework, and thus exclusionary to those religious individuals who 
do not share in that framework? The JFS case highlights a 
fundamental challenge to lawmakers who enshrine religious liberty 
into their legal codes and to judges who must interpret those laws.  
Namely, lawmakers and judges have to define and delimit what 
religion is, and as this case demonstrates, that is no simple task.  
  
